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The Common Good of Practices 
Jack L. Sammons 
Has Fish, in defending the integrity of academic practice, trivialized it? 
This issue haunts Fish’s deflationary account (“it’s just a job”) throughout, 
but it is an issue he addresses directly only in the coda. This is the issue I 
want to address here, but without exploring (because space does not permit) 
what difference what I have to say would make, if any, to his defense of a 
functional account of academic freedom, a defense I wholeheartedly 
endorse.  In fact, I hope to advance Fish’s cause – in the context of law and 
legal practice it has been my cause as well – by offering what I think is a 
better case for why Fish’s account of the work of the academy does not 
trivialize it.  My argument is that the practice relates to “larger concerns of 
life” in ways required by the practice itself; that what it offers in this regard 
are not “by products” or “side effects” as Fish describes them, but 
constitutive of what it means to be a practice.  For no practice is completely 
closed.  Each is purposive in at least one sense: every practice, for its own 
good, seeks to foster within the broader culture the ability to appreciate that 
which the practice has on offer. It does this, primarily, by initiating people 
into its ways of thinking, by teaching in other words. 
Practices “tend towards their own elaboration regardless of our explicit 
intentions.”1 In other words, once introduced to the way of thinking a 
practice has on offer – think the practice of carving (and wood) or Fish’s 
practice of literary criticism (and texts broadly construed) – we find 
ourselves perceiving things, even well-known things, in new ways. This is 
an autonomous tendency not dependent upon taking up the practice in any 
full sense; a course or two might do.  Through their elaboration, practices 
bring things into their own.  They “gather” as Heidegger would put it, and 
thus tend to connect to the rest of the community’s life in ways such that the 
practice (and the character it requires) is thought to be worthy.  This is, of 
course, only a tendency, a “gentle law” as Heidegger described it. 
Nevertheless, through it, the stability of practices (that Fish so admires) 
tends to become the stability of one’s life. 
And this is a good thing.  It is one of those “common goods” that 
frighten Fish (and well they should) for their corrupting potential.  It is, 
 
   Griffin B. Bell Professor of Law Emeritus, Mercer University School of Law 
1 Charles Spinosa, Derridean Dispersion and Heideggerian Articulation, in THE PRACTICE TURN 
IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY 199, 200 (Theodore R. Schatzki et al. eds., 2001).  I am much indebted to 
Spinosa for helping me articulate the ideas in this paragraph. 
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however, a common good that the practice itself has offered by suggesting 
to the culture that consequential inquiry should stop at this point, e.g., that 
learning to carve wood or read Milton well are self-justifying activities, as 
is play for example, or speech – as I argued contra Fish on a previous 
occasion – within a life well lived. 
Thus, through its elaboration the practice teaches the culture to 
appreciate what it offers.  Such teaching, however, will be received only if 
there are people within the culture attuned to the practice.  So “take this 
course,” “offer these courses,” “create this department” spoken to students, 
department chairs, and administrators, does not need to be spoken 
disingenuously, i.e., “I won’t be trying to do these things, but it might 
happen,” as Fish suggests. 
Now I believe that Stanley (if I may) will say that this common good is 
a “side effect” or a “by product,” terms he uses to be clear that certain 
goods will not occur absent “the pursuit of truth in the company of 
students.” But it isn’t, nor does he need to characterize it as such, for there 
is no threat of external corruption here, but its opposite.  For every practice 
sufficient to have internal goods will necessarily seek its own continuation 
and its own flourishing as a constitutive aim.  Every practice is purposive in 
this way. This is far from being a trivial matter, but one essential to the type 
of people we are to become.2 
 
 
2  I have one other concern with Fish’s account if the editors will permit me the liberty of adding 
it here.  Fish seems to think that every inquiry (and especially those in the company of students) by 
every practitioner must be disinterested.  Yet inquiries within a practice are “within a practice,” which is 
to say that less disinterested inquiries are permitted so long as they are evaluated only in the practices 
own terms.  In other words, it is the conversation within the practice that must remain “disinterested” in 
Fish’s sense. And, in any case, this is matter of motivation as Fish says it is and our motivations are 
always multiple, complex, and often confused.  This is not an issue, however, because the conversations 
are within the practice. 
